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SURVEY SECTION
Administrative Law. In re Marjorie R. Yashar, 713 A.2d 787
(R.I. 1998). All requests by an attorney asking that he and the
members of his firm be excused from ever appearing before a cer-
tain Administrative Adjudication Court judge due to an alleged
bias, must first be made to the judge in question before or at trial.
Additionally, requests to be excused from appearing before a judge
may only be made with respect to a pending action since no "party
to the cause" against whom any personal prejudice could be alleged
exists if specific cases are not pending.
In In re Marjorie R. Yashar,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
quashed an order by the Administrative Adjudication Court's Chief
Judge excusing Attorney Richard S. Humphrey "'and members
and associates of his law firm from appearing before [Judge
Marjorie Yashari at any hearings, trials and other matters' at the
AAC"2 and remanded the case back to the Administrative Adjudi-
cation Court.3 The court held that the order was inappropriate
since it was not a mere scheduling or administrative directive 4 but
rather a disputed judicial question which should have been ad-
dressed by Judge Yashar.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 6, 1997, Attorney Richard Humphrey wrote to
Chief Judge Pallozzi requesting that he issue an order excusing
both Humphrey and members of his firm from ever appearing
before Judge Yashar.6 Humphrey initiated this request in re-
sponse to "'the unsettling rulings issued during trial by Judge
Yashar in the case styled State of Rhode Island ex rel. Town of
Scituate v. Frank Finn .... ,"7 In Finn, Mr. Humphrey represented
the defendant who was charged with illegally refusing to submit to
a breathalyzer test in violation of Rhode Island General Laws sec-
1. 713 A.2d 787 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 789 (quoting the order signed by Chief Judge Pallozzi of the Admin-
istrative Adjudication Court on December 29, 1997).
3. See id. at 791.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 791.
6. See id. at 788.
7. Id. (quoting to the text of the letter written by Attorney Richard
Humphrey to Chief Judge Pallozzi on October 6, 1997).
1999] 605
606 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:605
tion 31-27-2.1.8 At the trial there was an evidentiary inconsistency
as to when the alleged violation occurred. 9 Despite the inconsis-
tency, the judge found the defendant in violation of the statute.10
On appeal, a panel of three Administrative Adjudication Court
judges reversed the lower court's decision holding that "Judge
Yashar had acted arbitrarily in rejecting a police officer's testi-
mony concerning the date of the incident... 'without offering rea-
sons for rejecting the testimony.'"" Based on this prior ruling, Mr.
Humphrey indicated that he thought it would be best if he did not
have to represent any more clients in front of Judge Yashar.12 In
response to this letter, Chief Judge Pallozzi conferred with Judge
Yashar. 13
On December 19, 1997, Judge Yashar responded to the request
in writing by asserting her position that Chief Judge Pallozzi
should not grant a blanket recusal. 14 Rather, any assertions of
bias can and should be raised on a case-by-case basis in the form of
a recusal motion before or during trial.'5
On December 29, 1997, Chief Judge Pallozzi informed Judge
Yashar that effective immediately he was issuing an order excus-
ing Mr. Humphrey and members of his firm from appearing before
her in the Administrative Adjudication Court. 16 In response to
this order, Judge Yashar petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme
Court for certiorari. 17
BACKGROUND
All requests to recuse a judge because of his/her alleged bias
towards an attorney ought to be brought to the attention of the
judge in question either before or at trial.'8 Additionally, such re-
8. See id. at 789.
9. See id. (noting that the arresting officer testified that the violation oc-
curred on May 6, 1997 and the Law Enforcement Report and the Rights for Use at
the Station form contrarily stated that the violation occurred on May 5, 1997).
10. See id.
11. Id. (quoting appeals panel statement).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 790 (citing State v. Nidever, 390 A.2d 368, 369-70 (R.I. 1978)
(holding that "[tihe customary manner in which one raises the issue of prejudice is
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quests need to be in relation to a specific case and they cannot be
phrased as a blanket motion requesting that a judge be prohibited
from presiding over all cases involving a particular attorney or his
associates. 19
Motions to disqualify a judge will be granted if (1) a judge
harps extraordinary bias against an attorney or (2) a judge is bi-
ased "for or against a party to the cause."20 The burden rests on
the moving party to prove "'the actions of the trial justice were af-
fected by facts and events which were not pertinent nor before the
court."' 2 1 A moving party cannot satisfy this burden of proof
merely by establishing that a judge had previously "ruled ad-
versely against a litigant"22 or that a judge harbors animosity to-
wards an attorney.23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Yashar court addressed the issue of whether Chief Judge
Pallozzi erred by issuing a blanket order which prohibited Judge
Yashar from presiding over any litigation involving Attorney
Humphrey and his associates. 24 The court held that the order was
improper for two reasons. First, the court held the order invalid
since Humphrey was unable to prove either that (1) Judge Yashar
held an "extraordinary bias" against him or that (2) Judge Yashar
harbored a personal bias "for or against a party to the cause."25
Specifically, the court held that Humphrey could not prove that the
judge was biased against him solely on the fact that she had previ-
ously decided a case against one of his clients. 26 Additionally, the
order was quashed since Humphrey was unable to prove that the
judge harbored a personal bias against a party to the cause.27 The
by appropriate motion at trial, a motion for mistrial or for disqualification of the
justice presiding")).
19. See id.
20. Id. (quoting State v. Storms, 311 A.2d 567, 569 (R.I. 1973)).
21. Id. (quoting Nidever, 390 A.2d at 370).
22. Id. (citing In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 654 (R.I. 1992) (stating that ad-
verse rulings by a judge are not sufficient grounds for recusal)).
23. See id. (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1314
(2d Cir. 1988) (holding that "bias against a lawyer, even if found to exist, without
more is not bias against his client")).
24. Id. at 789-91.
25. Id. at 790.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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court held that since Humphrey's request to be excused from ap-
pearing before Judge Yashar was not related to any pending litiga-
tion, "no 'party to the cause' against whom any personal prejudice
could be alleged, much less proven" existed.28
Second, the court held that even if Humphrey could have es-
tablished bias, the order was still invalid since it was inappropri-
ate for Chief Judge Pallozzi to issue the order without first
referring the request to Judge Yashar.29 Specifically, since the re-
quest was essentially a petition to disqualify Judge Yashar be-
cause of her alleged bias, the request should have been posed to
her as a judicial question.30 For these reasons, the court quashed
the order and remanded the case back to the Administrative Adju-
dication Court.31
CONCLUSION
In In re Yashar, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that it
was impermissible for the Chief Judge of the Administrative Adju-
dication Court to excuse Attorney Humphrey from appearing
before Judge Yashar in all future litigation.32 Rather, such peti-
tions to disqualify a judge ought to be addressed on a case-by-case
basis so that one can fully assess the alleged bias on the "party to
the cause."33 Additionally, such recusal requests must first be ad-
dressed by the judge in question.34
Heather E. Marsden
28. Id.
29. See id. at 790-91.
30. See id. at 791.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 790.
34. See id. at 790-91.
